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Abstract
An update of the chapter on Mental, Behavioral and Neurodevelopmental Disorders in the International
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) is of great interest around the world. The recent
approval of the 11th Revision of the ICD (ICD-11) by the World Health Organization (WHO) raises broad questions
about the status of nosology of mental disorders as a whole as well as more focused questions regarding changes
to the diagnostic guidelines for specific conditions and the implications of these changes for practice and research.
This Forum brings together a broad range of experts to reflect on key changes and controversies in the ICD-11
classification of mental disorders. Taken together, there is consensus that the WHO’s focus on global applicability
and clinical utility in developing the diagnostic guidelines for this chapter will maximize the likelihood that it will be
adopted by mental health professionals and administrators. This focus is also expected to enhance the application
of the guidelines in non-specialist settings and their usefulness for scaling up evidence-based interventions. The
new mental disorders classification in ICD-11 and its accompanying diagnostic guidelines therefore represent an
important, albeit iterative, advance for the field.
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Introduction
Dan J. Stein (Fig. 1) and Geoffrey M. Reed (Fig. 2)
Classification systems for mental disorders continue to
receive considerable attention. Work by the World
Health Organization (WHO) on the Eleventh Revision
of the International Classification of Diseases and Re-
lated Health Problems (ICD-11) and by the American
Psychiatric Association on the Fifth Edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) has led to vigorous debates in the scientific lit-
erature, among clinicians and health advocates, and in
the lay media (for example, regarding the inclusion of
gaming disorder and compulsive sexual behaviour dis-
order) [1, 2]. In the context of the recent approval of the
ICD-11 by the World Health Assembly and its pending
implementation around the world, a number of ques-
tions arise regarding the status of nosology of mental
disorders as a whole as well as about changes to the
diagnostic guidelines for specific conditions and the im-
plications of these changes for practice and research.
First, the need for two classification systems — the
ICD and the DSM — has been questioned. At first
glance, it seems odd that there should be contrasting ap-
proaches to mental disorders. However, different
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diagnostic systems are arguably needed for different pur-
poses. The DSM-III, for example, made an enormous
contribution by ensuring that diagnostic procedures
were reliable, providing a foundation for mental health
research and leading to DSM criteria being rapidly
adopted by investigators. During the development of the
chapter on Mental, Behavioral or Neurodevelopmental
Disorders in ICD-11, a particular focus was placed on
clinical utility and global applicability [3] based on the
idea that this would lead to a classification system that is
of particular value for global mental health, providing
WHO member states and health professionals with a
better tool for reducing the mental health treatment gap
and the global burden of mental disorders.
Second, does the updating of classification systems in
fact strengthen mental health practice and research? A
great deal of dissatisfaction has been expressed with
current nosologies; criticism ranges from the view that
our nosologies have medicalized problems of daily life,
to the view that the constructs employed in existing clas-
sifications are insufficiently grounded in contemporary
neuroscience. Still, it is difficult to argue with the general
principle that comprehensive evaluation and differential
diagnosis is a key part of clinical practice. Furthermore,
there have been impressive advances in the science of
nosology — a classification system that is more reliable,
with better diagnostic validity and greater clinical utility
should certainly contribute to stronger practice and
research.
Third, how important is the recent release of the ICD-
11, with its updated chapter on Mental, Behavioral or
Neurodevelopmental disorders? What specific changes
does it contribute to psychiatric nosology and how valu-
able are these changes for clinicians and patients?
In order to begin to address these questions, we asked
a range of authors to comment on revisions to the ICD-
11 from the perspective of their specific areas of expert-
ise. The commentaries that follow cover a range of im-
portant mental disorders and will bring readers up to
date on many of the questions and controversies regard-
ing their diagnosis, on how the ICD-11 has addressed
these, and the implications for clinical practice and
research.
Fig. 1 Dan Stein. Dr. Dan J. Stein is Professor and Chair of the Dept
of Psychiatry at the University of Cape Town, Director of the South
African Medical Research Council’s Unit on Risk & Resilience in
Mental Disorders, and Scientific Director of UCT’s Neuroscience
Institute. His training includes doctoral degrees in both clinical
neuroscience and philosophy, and a post-doctoral fellowship in
psychopharmacology. He is a clinician-scientist-advocate whose
work has long focused on anxiety and related disorders, including
obsessive–compulsive spectrum conditions and post-traumatic stress
disorder, as well as other issues relevant to the African context
Fig. 2 Geoffrey Reed. Dr. Geoffrey M. Reed has coordinated the
development of ICD-11 classification of Mental, Behavioral or
Neurodevelopmental Disorders in the Department of Mental Health
and Substance Abuse, World Health Organization since 2008. He is
Professor of Medical Psychology, Global Mental Health Programs,
Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University Vagelos College of
Physicians and Surgeons. He founded the WHO Global Clinical
Practice Network (http://gcp.network), comprising more than 15,000
mental health and primary care professionals from 158 countries
contributing directly to ICD-11 through participation in field studies
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The focus of the commentaries in this article is the
Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (CDDG)
for ICD-11 Mental, Behavioual and Neurodevelopmental
Disorders developed by the WHO Department of Men-
tal Health and Substance Abuse. The version of the
ICD-11 intended as a basis for statistical reporting does
not provide sufficient information for reliable clinical ap-
plication, The CDDG is a more comprehensive version
that provides clinicians with detailed clinical guidance
for diagnosing mental disorders in clinical settings. A
draft review version of the CDDG for most disorder
groupings is available for review and comment by mem-
bers of the Global Clinical Practice Network (https://
gcp.network). The statistical version is available at
https://icd.who.int/dev11/l-m/en.
Neurodevelopmental disorders in the ICD-11: has
the term outlived its usefulness?
Peter Szatmari (Fig. 3)
Classification systems are made to carry a heavy burden.
They serve multiple purposes in supporting clinical ac-
tivities, treatment planning, conducting research and in
policy decision-making. In child and youth mental
health, and in particular neurodevelopmental disorders,
diagnosis and classification also tend to generate an
enormous amount of controversy, which can confuse
stakeholders who rely on consensus-based classification
systems to make policy and clinical decisions. The Neu-
rodevelopmental Disorders section of the ICD-11
represents a significant departure from the ICD-10 and
is very much aligned with recent decisions made by the
DSM-5. But it is still hard to please everybody.
The term ‘neurodevelopmental disorders’ has a long
history, yet it had not been included in previous editions
of the ICD or the DSM. The term applies to a group of
disorders of early onset that affect both cognitive and so-
cial communicative development, are multi-factorial in
origin, display important sex differences where males are
more commonly affected than females, and have a
chronic course with impairment generally lasting into
adulthood [4]. The term distinguishes these disorders
from other more common disorders of childhood, such
as anxiety and mood disorders, which were thought to
arise from some type of psychosocial adversity and have
a more episodic course. In the ICD-11, the category
‘neurodevelopmental disorders’ includes (1) disorders of
intellectual development, (2) developmental speech or
language disorders, (3) autism spectrum disorders
(ASD), (4) developmental learning disorders, (5) devel-
opmental motor coordination disorder, (6) attention def-
icit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), (7) stereotyped
movement disorder, and (8) a remainder category la-
beled ‘other neurodevelopmental disorders’.
There are a number of very important departures from
the ICD-10, which are consistent with recent literature
and follow, in spirit, the changes from the DSM-IV to
the DSM-5 [5]. First, the ICD-10 does not have a specific
grouping for neurodevelopmental disorders and uses
slightly different terminology for the specific conditions
that have been included within it — ‘mental retardation’,
‘disorders of psychological development’, and ‘pervasive
developmental disorder’ are the terms used instead. Sec-
ond, hyperkinetic disorder (now termed ‘attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder’ in ICD-11) appears under the
ICD-10 category of ‘behavioral and emotional disorders
with onset in childhood or adolescence’. Third, it is not-
able that, in the ICD-10, pervasive developmental dis-
order is exclusionary for hyperkinetic disorder, a
stipulation that is no longer present in the ICD-11. Now,
in the ICD-11, both ASD and ADHD may co-exist in
the same individual. The age of onset for ASD is now in
the early developmental period rather than being speci-
fied as having an onset by 3 years of age.
Other major changes include the fact that the eight
different pervasive developmental disorders in the ICD-
10, including childhood autism, atypical autism and
Asperger syndrome, have disappeared entirely and are
now grouped together under one category, namely ASD.
This is a notable change that still arouses some contro-
versy [6]. Several systematic reviews have found that the
distinctions between these subtypes appear to be of du-
bious diagnostic validity or to represent quantitative ra-
ther than qualitative variation [7, 8]. In both the DSM-5
Fig. 3 Peter Szatmari. Dr. Szatmari is the Chief of the Child and
Youth Mental Health Collaborative at the Hospital for Sick Children,
the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, and the University of
Toronto in Toronto, Canada. He has worked in the area of autism
spectrum disorders for many years focusing on diagnosis and
classification, genetics, and follow-up studies
Stein et al. BMC Medicine           (2020) 18:21 Page 3 of 24
and the ICD-11, grouping all these individuals together
is now accompanied by adding different ‘specifiers’ to
the ASD diagnosis in an attempt to take account of the
enormous heterogeneity inherent in the disorder’s pres-
entation. These specifiers include intellectual level, lan-
guage level, medical or genetic comorbidities, and
mental health comorbidities.
While there is general support for ‘lumping’ the ASDs
rather than ‘splitting’ them, there has been little or no
research on the clinical utility of these specifiers nor on
whether these are the ‘right’ specifiers. It is to be hoped
that this conceptualization of a single disorder with mul-
tiple specifiers will foster a new generation of studies
that attempts to consider the remarkable heterogeneity
seen in ASD both between individuals with ASD but also
within the same person with ASD over time.
The recognition that ADHD and ASD can coexist is
also an important refinement that is extremely useful
since there is good evidence that ASD individuals with
concurrent ADHD can benefit from stimulant medica-
tions [9]. There is also growing evidence that ASD and
ADHD share common genetic variants, similar psycho-
logical deficits and neuroimaging differences [10–12].
Nevertheless, despite the term ‘neurodevelopmental
disorders’ now being official, it could be argued that the
designation has outlived its usefulness — the various
conditions contained under this grouping differ from
each other (from severe ASD to mild coordination dis-
order) such that they have little in common. Therefore,
the allocation of treatment interventions and prognosis
cannot be generalized from one neurodevelopmental dis-
order to another. If clinical utility is the prime criterion
for the added value of diagnostic terms, then ‘neurodeve-
lopmental disorders’ as a meta-term appears to make a
minimal contribution.
Moreover, it could also be argued that all disorders
with onset in childhood or adolescence are neurodeve-
lopmental disorders. Schizophrenia, mood (including bi-
polar), and anxiety disorders are all brain-based
disorders. They have also, on occasion, been referred to
as neurodevelopmental disorders, especially schizophre-
nia [13, 14], as they involve difficulties in the execution
of intellectual, motor, language, or social functions as
well as other domains that arise from alterations in brain
circuits. Similar to the definition of neurodevelopmental
disorders in the ICD-11, the presumptive etiology of
mood disorders in childhood and adolescence, for ex-
ample, is also ‘complex’ and is thought to arise from
‘physical’ processes (inflammatory processes, chronic
sleep disturbance, possibly the microbiome) and genetic
factors [15–17] as well as from various types of stressful
life events. The growing awareness of the comorbidity of
mood and anxiety disorders with various neurodevelop-
mental disorders (once the children reach adolescence)
is another indication that the boundary between neuro-
developmental and non-neurodevelopmental disorders
in the ICD-11 is ambiguous.
In other words, what does not constitute a neurodeve-
lopmental disorder among disorders that arise in child-
hood and adolescence? More importantly, what is the
clinical utility of grouping them together and separating
them from disruptive behaviour and internalizing disor-
ders? It is possible that mood and anxiety disorders are
more closely associated with psychosocial adversity than
with neurodevelopmental disorders; however, surely
these are quantitative rather than qualitative differences.
Furthermore, so many evidence gaps remain in our un-
derstanding of etiology and pathogenesis that to build
the foundation of a classification system on unknown
and assuredly complex aetiological factors is a fragile en-
terprise. The term represents child and adolescent psy-
chiatry’s version of the old ‘functional’ versus ‘organic’
distinction that has long been done away with in adult
psychiatry following remarkable advances in neurosci-
ence. Perhaps it is time to put the term ‘neurodevelop-
mental disorders’ into the history books as well?
Schizophrenia or other primary psychotic
disorders
Wolfgang Gaebel (Fig. 4)
The development of the chapter on Mental, Behavioral
or Neurodevelopmental Disorders in the ICD-11 in-
cluded collaboration with stakeholders; consideration of
applications in clinical practice, research, teaching and
training, health statistics, and public health; and a focus
on clinical utility, global applicability, and reduction of
disease burden [18]. The initial proposals of the WHO
Working Group on the Classification of Psychotic Disor-
ders for the ICD-11 [19], which I chaired and comprised
experts from all global regions, were revised in response
to public comment, expert peer review and results from
field testing under the guidance of an international ad-
visory group appointed by the WHO Department of
Mental Health and Substance Abuse.
The most important changes in the classification of
psychotic disorders from the ICD-10 to ICD-11, based
on evidence review and consensus of the Working
Group, include the following:
 The ICD-10 section entitled ‘Schizophrenia, schizo-
typal and delusional disorders’ has been replaced by
‘Schizophrenia or other primary psychotic disorders’.
The term ‘primary’ was intended to distinguish these
disorders from bipolar and other mental or medical
disorders that may include psychotic symptoms.
 Accordingly, non-primary (i.e. ‘secondary’) psychotic
disorders, such as psychotic disorders due to sub-
stance use or withdrawal and psychotic disorders in
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general medical conditions, are respectively placed
in the sections of the mental disorders chapter cor-
responding to ‘Disorders due to substance use’ and
‘Mental and behavioural disorders associated with
disorders or diseases classified elsewhere’. However,
the unique features of the ICD-11, including its fully
relational and electronic development for complex
coding, make it possible to cross-list substance-
induced psychotic disorders and those associated
with general medical conditions in the section on
primary psychotic disorders as well, enhancing clin-
ical utility while still retaining the ability to allocate
and aggregate these disorders appropriately for pub-
lic health reporting.
 The overall structure proposed for the ICD-11 block
on ‘Schizophrenia or other primary psychotic disor-
ders’ is as follows:
Schizophrenia
Schizoaffective disorder
Acute and transient psychotic disorder (ATPD)
Schizotypal disorder
Delusional disorder
Other primary psychotic disorders
Unspecified primary psychotic disorders
 Disorders in this section continue to be categorized
on the basis of their psychopathological profile,
duration, or course characteristics, as described in
the Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines
being developed for use by mental health
professionals in clinical settings [20].
 Similar to the DSM-5, in the ICD-11, the nine ICD-
10 schizophrenia subtypes (paranoid, hebephrenic,
catatonic, etc.) are now omitted because of their lon-
gitudinal instability and lack of prognostic validity
[21], and have been replaced by a system of coded
symptom and course qualifiers (see below). Al-
though first-rank symptoms are somewhat deem-
phasized [22], a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires
the presence of at least two of seven symptom cat-
egories, including at least one ‘core’ symptom. Core
symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, experi-
ences of influence, passivity or control, and disorga-
nized thinking. Symptoms should have been clearly
present for most of the time during a period of at
least 1 month, hence retaining the ICD-10 duration
requirement. If the symptom requirements for
schizophrenia are fulfilled but the duration is less
than 1 month, ‘Other specified primary psychotic
disorder’ would be the appropriate diagnosis until
the duration requirement is met.
 In the ICD-11, a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder
should be made only when the symptom criteria of
schizophrenia and of a moderate or severe mood
episode are fulfilled simultaneously or within a few
days of each other. The total duration requirement
is 1 month, including both mood and schizophrenic
symptoms. According to long-term studies, 10% of
persons with schizoaffective disorder have only a
single episode, while decades-long, symptom-free in-
tervals may occur between episodes among people
who have had more than one episode [23, 24].
 For the category of ‘acute and transient psychotic
disorder’ (ATPD), the ICD-11 places the diagnostic
focus on sudden onset, brief duration and high vari-
ability/fluctuation of psychotic and affective symp-
toms (i.e. the ‘polymorphic’ clinical presentation).
For simplification and due to a lack of empirical sup-
port for the prognostic and therapeutic relevance of
the distinctions made in the ICD-10 among several
subtypes of ATPD, only F23.0 ‘Acute polymorphic
psychotic disorder without symptoms of schizophre-
nia’ is retained as the core clinical category for
ATPD, whereas F23.3 ‘Other acute predominantly
delusional disorder’ is incorporated into the revised
category delusional disorder. F23.1 ‘Acute
Fig. 4 Wolfgang Gaebel. Dr. med. Wolfgang Gaebel is Professor of
Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at the Heinrich-Heine University
Düsseldorf, Germany. He was Director of the Department of
Psychiatry and Psychotherapy and Head of the LVR-Klinikum
Düsseldorf (LVR-KD) from 1992 until 2016. From 2014 to 2016, he
was also Founding Director of the LVR-Institute for Mental
Healthcare Research (LVR-IVF). Since 2014, he is also Head of the
WHO Collaborating Centre on Quality Management and
Empowerment in Mental Health at the LVR-KD
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polymorphic psychotic disorder with symptoms of
schizophrenia’ and F23.2 ‘Acute schizophrenia-like
psychotic disorder’ are replaced by ‘Other specified
primary psychotic disorder’ if the duration is less
than 1 month, and should be diagnosed as schizo-
phrenia if all diagnostic requirements are met.
 ICD-10 categories F22 ‘Persistent delusional
disorder’, F23.3 ‘Other acute predominantly
delusional psychotic disorder’, and F24 ‘Induced
delusional disorder’, which is a very rare entity, are
collapsed into a single diagnostic category of
‘Delusional disorder’, omitting the durational
qualifier ‘persistent’ to adapt to its durational
heterogeneity and also to simplify the classification
system.
 Schizotypal disorder remains largely unchanged in
the ICD-11. As in the ICD-10, it is considered a vali-
dated member of the schizophrenia ‘spectrum’ as a
potential precursor or subsyndromal variant of
schizophrenia [25] rather than a personality disorder
and is therefore included in the section on primary
psychotic disorders.
 As an alternative to subtypes, coded qualifiers to
describe the course of the disorder as well as
symptom presentation are included in the section
and can be applied to all primary psychotic
disorders. Course qualifiers allow the differentiation
of first- and multiple-episode cases, and between
acute episodes with symptoms, full or partial remis-
sion, and a chronic course due to different prognos-
tic implications [26]. Symptom qualifiers include the
presence of positive, negative, depressive, manic,
psychomotor, and cognitive symptoms, each of
which may be rated as mild, moderate, or severe. A
qualifier for cognitive symptoms is intended to pro-
vide more diagnostic and therapeutic attention to
cognitive symptoms as these are linked to functional
outcome [27]. The ‘psychomotor symptoms’ quali-
fier includes catatonic symptoms. In addition, cata-
tonia is also included as a separate category in the
ICD-11 [28, 29].
The inclusion of mental and behavioral disorders
alongside all the other diagnostic medical entities in
healthcare is an important feature of the ICD that has
consequences for clinical practice and research. A classi-
fication that uses a common framework across all dis-
ease and disorder areas is more likely to be used by all
specialties and general healthcare workers in a similar
way, thereby yielding comparable health statistics results.
The advanced classification and coding framework of
the ICD-11 will also facilitate research in fields of epi-
demiology to analyze mechanisms of comorbidity, causal
relationships, and treatment options. Another
opportunity is the provision of conceptual parity of psy-
chopathology with the rest of the medical system for
clinical, administrative, and financial functions in health-
care [18]. As the ICD-11 will be used worldwide by a
large range of health professionals [30], its definitions
and diagnostic guidelines should not only be reliable
(and valid), but also useful and easy to implement by dif-
ferent users in different clinical settings and around the
world.
As internet-based and clinical field trials have demon-
strated for psychotic disorders, diagnostic reliabilities for
the ICD-11 compared to the ICD-10 have markedly im-
proved for most of the diagnostic categories in this sec-
tion [31]. Improvements have also been shown for
judgments on the ease of use and related utility mea-
sures based on the use of diagnostic guidelines by health
professionals and brief descriptions by medical records
coders [32], although reliabilities for the latter show
room for improvement. Accordingly, the introduction of
the ICD-11 in the field of psychotic disorders will con-
tribute to improved mental health care, particularly due
to a more dimensional approach to symptoms
characterization that allows for more individualized
treatment selection. More generally, implementation of
the ICD-11 chapter on mental disorders will profit from
intense education and training of the mental health
workforce.
Bipolar disorders
Michael Berk (Fig. 5) and Eduard Vieta (Fig. 6)
The ICD-11 brings significant changes from the ICD-10.
Concordant with the overarching strategy, most changes
go towards harmonizing the ICD-11 with the DSM-5.
Noting the imperfection of both systems, inevitable
given the absence of a valid pathophysiological founda-
tion, this is desirable, as diagnostic labels principally rep-
resent a common global language. Perhaps the greatest
point of difference is that the DSM-5 retains the require-
ment for a set number of phenomena across diagnoses,
while the ICD-11 offers a descriptive approach and al-
lows the clinician to pattern-fit the diagnosis. Arguably,
the DSM system is most useful for research, where ob-
jective, reproducible, and verifiable diagnoses are essen-
tial, but the ICD better captures the way most clinicians
actually think and behave [33].
The ICD-11 considers bipolar disorders as mood dis-
orders, as the ICD-10 did (but not the DSM-5, which
lists them in a separate chapter). Perhaps the most sig-
nificant change is that the ICD-10 required two or more
episodes of elevated mood, whereas the ICD-11 has low-
ered the threshold to one or more manic or mixed epi-
sodes to make a diagnosis of bipolar I disorder. A manic
episode is therefore no longer an independently diagnos-
able condition as it was in the ICD-10. This parallels a
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significant shift in clinical thinking. Orthodoxy had it
that individuals should not start mood stabilizers until a
couple of manic episodes had occurred. More recent evi-
dence suggests that the response to treatment is best
after the first episode [34] and declines thereafter, and
this decline is associated with a potentially neuropro-
gressive process with substantial clinical and functional
sequelae [35, 36]. Additionally, the ICD-11 now requires
a duration of at least 1 week for mania, while the ICD-10
did not have duration criteria and the ICD-11 waives
this if treatment is present.
Allowing a mixed episode is a further significant
change from the ICD-10, which specified the require-
ment of hypomania or mania and depression. Again,
mixed episodes and their treatment implications are in-
creasingly recognized in the clinical literature [37] and
this is a welcome change suggesting the need for a dif-
ferentially tailored treatment approach. Mixed episodes
are defined as being characterized by rapid alternation
between or an admixture of prominent manic or
depressive symptoms with a duration of at least 2 weeks,
and therefore they remain in the ICD-11 as an episode
type as opposed to the DSM-5, which converted those
into a specifier. Rapid cycling is defined based on the
frequency of episodes of mood disturbance, requiring at
least four episodes in the past 12 months, as traditionally
stated.
In the ICD-11, the diagnostic guideline for mania allows
for euphoria, irritability, or expansiveness together with
increased activity or subjectively increased energy as well
as other characteristic manic symptoms, without specify-
ing the number of symptoms. There remains controversy
around the inclusion of irritability, which is a far more
non-specific phenomenon with much overlap with disor-
ders such as ADHD, conduct disorder, and personality
disorders [38]. Allowing mania based principally in the
context of irritability risks blurring the boundary between
these disorders [39]. However, the requirement for in-
creased activity or energy is an important and positive
change, concordant with recent data suggesting a critical
role of a biphasic change in mitochondrial energy gener-
ation as core to the biology of the disorder [40].
Fig. 5 Michael Berk. Professor Michael Berk is currently a NHMRC
Senior Principal research Fellow and is Alfred Deakin Chair of
Psychiatry at Deakin University and Barwon Health, where he heads
IMPACT, the Institute for Mental and Physical Health and Clinical
Translation. He also is an Honorary Professorial Research fellow in
the Department of Psychiatry, the Florey Institute for Neuroscience
and Mental Health and Orygen Youth Health at Melbourne
University, as well as in the School of Public Health and Preventive
Medicine at Monash University. His major interests are in the
discovery and implementation of novel therapies as well as risk
factors and prevention of psychiatric disorders
Fig. 6 Eduard Vieta. Dr. Eduard Vieta is Professor of Psychiatry at the
University of Barcelona, Chair of the Department of Psychiatry and
Psychology at the Hospital Clinic, and Scientific Director of the
Spanish Biomedical Research Network on Mental Health (CIBERSAM)
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The ICD-10 described hypomania and included bipo-
lar II disorder under the heading of ‘Other bipolar
affective disorders’. The ICD-11 harmonizes this with
the DSM system allowing a bipolar type II diagnosis with
equal status to bipolar I disorder. In contrast to bipolar I
disorder, where impulsive or reckless behaviour are part
of the description, hypomania in bipolar II is defined as
not causing marked impairment in function. The contro-
versy around the duration of hypomania is avoided by
defining the duration as lasting for at least several days.
Similarly, cyclothymia, which stood in the ICD-10
under a separate grouping, is now incorporated in the
core bipolar or related disorders heading. These changes
substantially harmonize the ICD-11 and DSM-5 systems,
one overarching goal of the revision. Cyclothymia in-
cludes a duration definition of at least 2 years and re-
quires that numerous hypomanic or depressive
symptoms be present the majority of the time. While the
hypomanic symptomatology may or may not meet
threshold criteria for hypomania, but not mania, depres-
sion cannot be severe or prolonged enough to meet the
diagnostic requirement for a depressive episode. Curi-
ously, the cyclothymia rubric includes cycloid and cyclo-
thymic personality. This is a significant change echoing
the old Research Diagnostic Criteria that set the grounds
for the DSM-III and earlier literature on the effect of
temperament, suggesting a bridge between the core bi-
polar and unipolar mood disorders and the effect of
mood instability so commonly seen in borderline and
other personality disorders [41]. Finally, akin to the spec-
ifiers in the DSM system, the ICD-11 allows the use of
qualifiers to refine the description of current mood epi-
sodes, including prominent anxiety, melancholy (in de-
pressive episodes), current perinatal episode, seasonal
patterns, and rapid cycling, but no mention is made of
predominant polarity, a specifier with therapeutic impli-
cations under consideration for future editions of the
DSM [42].
Overall, the harmonization of the ICD-11 with the
DSM-5 is desirable, hopefully presaging greater global
uniformity in the use of a critical diagnostic language
and hence translation to evidence-based care. The
weaknesses of the two systems are both debatable and
unavoidable [43, 44] given the lack of any objective
pathophysiological compass and the limited specificity
of most currently available biomarkers in mental ill-
ness [45]. This is a welcome fillip to global clinical
care [46].
Depression
Mario Maj (Fig. 7)
Depression is reported to be the most common mental
disorder in the general population and one of the most
important contributors to the global burden of disease
worldwide. Therefore, its valid and reliable diagnosis is
essential not only from the psychiatric perspective but
also more generally with regards to public health.
In the ICD-11, a depressive episode is defined by the
concurrent presence of at least five out of a list of ten
symptoms, which must occur most of the day, nearly
every day, for at least 2 weeks. One of these symptoms
must be depressed mood or markedly diminished inter-
est or pleasure in activities. The mood disturbance must
result in significant functional impairment and not be a
manifestation of another health condition, due to the ef-
fects of a substance or medication, or better accounted
for by bereavement.
The ten symptoms are depressed mood, markedly di-
minished interest or pleasure in activities, reduced ability
to concentrate and sustain attention or marked indeci-
siveness, beliefs of low self-worth or excessive or in-
appropriate guilt, hopelessness about the future,
recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation or evi-
dence of attempted suicide, significantly disrupted sleep
or excessive sleep, significant changes in appetite or
weight, psychomotor agitation or retardation, and re-
duced energy or fatigue. The list includes one symptom
(hopelessness) that is not present in the DSM-5 criteria
for major depression, but which was found to perform
Fig. 7 Mario Maj. Dr. Mario Maj is Professor of Psychiatry and
Chairman at the Department of Psychiatry of the University of
Campania L. Vanvitelli in Naples, Italy. He has been President of the
European Psychiatric Association (2003–2004) and of the World
Psychiatric Association (2008–2011). He is the Editor of World
Psychiatry, the psychiatric journal with the highest impact factor
(34.024). He has been a member of the International Advisory Group
and Chairman of the Working Group on Mood and Anxiety
Disorders for the ICD-11. He has been a member of the Working
Group on Mood Disorders for the DSM-5
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more strongly than approximately half of the DSM
symptoms in differentiating depressive from non-
depressive subjects [47].
The description of a depressive episode is one of the
few instances in the ICD-11 in which specific thresholds
are provided with respect to both number and duration
of symptoms. Furthermore, the threshold concerning the
number of symptoms (at least five) is made consistent
with the DSM, whereas it was not in the ICD-10 (at least
four).
A major difference between the ICD-11 and the DSM-
5 relates to the so-called ‘bereavement exclusion’ —
present in the DSM-IV but deleted in the DSM-5. In the
ICD-11, as in the DSM-IV, the diagnosis of depression is
not excluded in a person who is bereaved, but the
threshold for that diagnosis is just made higher (as or-
dinarily happens in clinical practice) by requiring a lon-
ger duration of the depressive state (at least 1 month)
and the presence of some symptoms that are unlikely to
occur in ‘normal’ grief (extreme beliefs of low self-worth
and guilt not related to the lost loved one, presence of
psychotic symptoms, suicidal ideation, or psychomotor
retardation). The ICD-11 approach to the bereavement
issue has been supported (and the DSM-5 approach has
been disproved) by longitudinal prospective studies doc-
umenting that the risk of subsequent depressive episodes
during a period of follow-up was significantly lower in
people with baseline bereavement-related versus non-
bereavement-related major depression, and not different
in the bereaved group than among controls without a
history of depressive episodes [48, 49].
Interestingly, the ICD-11 states that a depressive epi-
sode is differentiated from a normal reaction to adverse
life events (e.g. divorce, job loss) “by the severity, range
and duration of symptoms” (as stated in the forthcoming
WHO Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines).
On the contrary, in the DSM-5, the decision of whether
a response to a significant loss qualifies or not for a diag-
nosis of a major depressive episode is left, in a specific
note, to ‘clinical judgment’, which contradicts the de-
clared aim of that diagnostic system to overcome the
“vagueness and subjectivity inherent in the traditional
diagnostic process” [50].
In the ICD-11, the strategy to introduce ‘qualifiers’
(corresponding to the DSM-5 ‘specifiers’) to represent
the heterogeneity of depression is adopted for the first
time (no qualifiers were present in the ICD-10). The
qualifiers proposed for depression are similar to the
DSM-5 specifiers, with the exception that the DSM-5
specifier ‘with mixed features’ is absent in the ICD-11.
In fact, the category ‘mixed episode’, eliminated in the
DSM-5, is retained in the ICD-11; indeed, the DSM-5
definition of major depression with mixed features is
highly controversial, as it includes typical manic
symptoms (such as elevated mood and grandiosity) that
have been found to be extremely rare among patients
with mixed depression, while excluding symptoms (such
as irritability, psychomotor agitation, and distractibility)
that are frequently reported in mixed depression. Not
surprisingly, major depression with mixed features, as
defined in the DSM-5, has very different correlates in
terms of treatment response compared to mixed depres-
sion as described in the literature [51].
The qualifier ‘with prominent anxiety symptoms’, in-
troduced in the ICD-11, is of special clinical interest. In-
deed, the presence of a significant anxiety component in
a depressive episode is associated with a higher suicide
risk, a longer duration of illness and a greater likelihood
of non-response to treatment.
The ICD-11 approach to the assessment of the severity
of the current depressive episode is analogous to that of
the DSM-5, except that the number of depressive symp-
toms is not considered among the criteria (a depressive
episode is regarded as mild, moderate, or severe depend-
ing on the intensity of the depressive symptoms and the
degree of functional impairment). The characterization
of the severity of depression remains unsatisfactory in
both diagnostic systems, and the need for the inclusion
of a simple and reliable rating scale for this purpose will
have to be considered in the future.
A long and detailed section, missing in the ICD-10, is
devoted in the ICD-11 to the delineation of the bound-
aries of depression with other mental disorders as well
as with ‘normality’ and normal grief.
The ICD-11 guidelines for depression have been found
to have substantial inter-clinician reliability and very
good clinical utility in field trials [31, 52]. Therefore, it is
expected that they will be well received in ordinary clin-
ical practice worldwide.
Anxiety disorders and obsessive–compulsive
disorder
Ymkje Anna de Vries (Fig. 8), Annelieke M. Roest (Fig. 9),
Peter de Jonge (Fig. 10)
Anxiety disorders form a heterogeneous group defined
by the presence of anxiety states such as worry, fear,
or panic. They are characterized by a chronic course
[53, 54] and an early age of onset [55]. Obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD) shares some of these
characteristics and has previously been considered an
anxiety disorder (e.g. in the DSM-IV). We therefore
discuss it alongside anxiety disorders.
In the ICD-11, the classification of anxiety disorders
has been simplified and brought into better agreement
with an evidence-based Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psy-
chopathology (HiTOP) [56]. This model proposes sev-
eral higher-order dimensions, including internalizing
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and externalizing dimensions, and aims to give an
aetiological account of mental disorders. The internaliz-
ing dimension is proposed to consist of several subdo-
mains, including fear (e.g. phobia) and distress (e.g.
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), major depressive
disorder). The ICD-10 grouped most anxiety disorders
and OCD into the heterogeneous grouping of ‘neurotic,
stress-related, and somatoform disorders’ (F40–F48),
and also split anxiety disorders into ‘phobic anxiety dis-
orders’ and ‘other anxiety disorders’ (GAD, mixed anx-
iety disorders, and panic disorder). While this split may
have some face validity, factor analytic models generally
find that panic disorder clusters with phobic disorders
into the fear subdomain of internalizing disorders [56].
A new category of ‘anxiety or fear-related disorders’,
which contains all anxiety disorders, including two
(separation anxiety disorder and selective mutism)
that were previously classed with childhood disorders,
has been introduced in the ICD-11. Since anxiety dis-
orders have similar symptoms (i.e. sympathetic
arousal and avoidance), the ICD-11 emphasizes the
focus of apprehension (e.g. fear of negative evaluation
by others in the case of social anxiety disorder) as
the basis for diagnostic differentiation between anxiety
disorders [57]. Hierarchical exclusion rules, which
often precluded explicit diagnosis of an anxiety dis-
order, particularly in individuals with mood disorders,
have also been removed in the ICD-11.
OCD has been placed into its own grouping of ‘obses-
sive–compulsive or related disorders’. This grouping also
includes several new disorders such as hoarding disorder
and body-focused repetitive behaviour disorders (broad-
ened from the ICD-10 diagnosis of trichotillomania).
Hypochondriasis has also been moved from the category
of ‘somatoform disorders’ into that of ‘obsessive–com-
pulsive or related disorders’.
The ICD-11 has maintained the a priori split between
mood and anxiety disorders, despite empirical findings that
generally show that GAD is more closely related to major
depressive disorder than it is to the other anxiety disorders.
However, by providing anxiety disorders their own group-
ing, including separation anxiety disorder with the other
anxiety disorders, and removing the artificial split between
phobic and other anxiety disorders, the structure of the
ICD-11 more closely approximates evidence-based models
of the structure of psychopathology. Furthermore, such
Fig. 8 Ymkje Anna de Vries. Dr. Ymkje Anna de Vries is a
postdoctoral researcher in the Developmental Psychology research
group at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Her research
is focused on the development and treatment of depressive and
anxiety disorders
Fig. 9 Annelieke Roest. Dr. Annelieke Roest works as an Assistant
Professor at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Her
research focuses on anxiety, including the epidemiology and
treatment of anxiety disorders, as well as the association between
anxiety and depression and somatic diseases
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categorization brings the ICD-11 into closer agreement
with the DSM-5.
Additionally, the ICD-11 closely resembles the DSM-5
in its disorder descriptions. Particularly, a requirement
that the disorder should result in significant distress or
impairment has been added to the description of all anx-
iety disorders. For agoraphobia, social anxiety disorder,
specific phobia, and GAD, a specification that symptoms
must persist for at least several months has also been
added. Moreover, the conceptual core of several disor-
ders, particularly panic disorder, GAD, and OCD, has
been updated to reflect current beliefs about these disor-
ders. With regard to panic disorder, the ICD-10 exclu-
sively focused on the presence of unexpected panic
attacks; however, in the ICD-11, persistent concerns
about these panic attacks and/or attempts to avoid the
recurrence of panic attacks are also considered essential
and impairing features of panic disorder. In the ICD-10,
GAD was conceptualized as free-floating worry that does
not predominate in any particular environmental cir-
cumstance. While the ICD-11 maintains free-floating
anxiety as a possible symptom, excessive worry focused
on multiple everyday events is also recognized as a pos-
sible core symptom of GAD. Finally, the ICD-10 defined
compulsions by their putative function (to prevent a
feared event), while the ICD-11 has a broader definition,
including all repetitive behaviors that an individual feels
driven to perform in response to an obsession, according
to rigid rules, or to achieve a sense of ‘completeness’.
The ICD-11 also includes repetitive mental acts as com-
pulsions, while the ICD-10 only focused on overt
behaviour.
In sum, several of the changes in the ICD-11, both at
the level of classification and at the level of disorder de-
scriptions, result in greater agreement with the DSM-5
and with empirical evidence on comorbidity. Further-
more, the addition of impairment and duration criteria
provides more guidance to distinguish disorder from
normality; these changes, along with the updates to dis-
order descriptions, are likely to align the ICD-11 more
closely with clinical practice.
Disorders specifically associated with stress
Andreas Maercker (Fig. 11) and Chris R. Brewin (Fig. 12)
The acknowledgment of stress as an external source of
mental disorders is still relatively new in psychiatric nos-
ology despite recognition that almost all mental disor-
ders, to a greater or lesser degree, are shaped by it. For
instance, psychosis tends to have much milder symp-
toms or even remain in a remission phase at low levels
of external stress [58]. The ICD-11 goes further in rec-
ognizing this by including a new grouping of ‘disorders
specifically associated with stress’ that identifies disor-
ders in which external stress is a necessary and promin-
ent causal factor. The grouping is parallel to ‘trauma and
Fig. 10 Peter de Jonge. Dr. Peter de Jonge is Professor and Head of
Department of Developmental Psychology at the University of
Groningen, the Netherlands. He is programme leader of the
Interdisciplinary Center Psychopathology and Emotion
Regulation (www.icpe.nl)
Fig. 11 Andreas Maercker. Dr. Andreas Maercker is Professor and
Chair of the Division Psychopathology and Clinical Intervention at
the University of Zurich, Switzerland. His research interests include
PTSD and its sibling disorders as well as cultural clinical psychology.
He chaired the ICD-11 Working Group on Stress-related Disorders
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stress-related disorders’ in the DSM-5. However, the
omission of the psychologically important but overused
term ‘trauma’ in the ICD-11 grouping title was deliber-
ate. The WHO Working Group decided that it was pref-
erable to employ the term ‘stress’ so as to reduce the
tendency to brand someone seeking professional help as
psychologically ‘traumatized’.
Moreover, the ICD and the DSM diverge significantly
in their description of stress-related disorders — for the
ICD-11, these are post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
complex PTSD, prolonged grief disorder, and adjust-
ment disorder (described below), whereas for the DSM-5
they are PTSD, acute stress disorder, and adjustment
disorder. (The respective groupings in both manuals also
include similar desciptions of the childhood disorders of
reactive attachment disorder and disinhibited social en-
gagement disorder, which are not further discussed
here.) The four new formulations of diagnoses within
the ICD-11 grouping of disorders specifically associated
with stress have generated a number of controversies.
PTSD
The ICD-11 has substantially simplifed the description
of PTSD, defining it in terms of three core symptoms
that most clearly distinguish PTSD from other disorders,
namely re-experiencing the traumatic event or events in
the present, deliberate avoidance of reminders, and a
sense of ongoing threat. Furthermore, the symptoms
must persist for at least several weeks and cause
significant impairment in functioning. In contrast, PTSD
is the most complex disorder in the DSM-5, with 20
symptoms organized into four symptom clusters. The
intention of the DSM-5 was to capture the full scope of
chronic post-traumatic phenotypes [59]. However, re-
cent research has demonstrated that the data fit the sim-
pler factor structure of the ICD-11 better than they do
that of the DSM-5 and that, as intended, when using the
ICD-11 definition there is a reduction in the degree of
comorbidity with major depression [60].
Complex PTSD
It has been argued for many years that chronic or re-
peated trauma leads to a more severe form of PTSD.
The ICD-10 contained a partly overlapping predecessor
diagnosis of ‘enduring personality change after cata-
strophic experiences’, which had very rarely been used in
clinical practice and research [61]. The ICD-11 defines
complex PTSD as consisting of the three core PTSD
symptoms described above accompanied by problems in
affect regulation, negative self-beliefs, and relationship
difficulties [62]. Chronic or repeated trauma is a risk fac-
tor rather than a requirement for the diagnosis, which is
based on the symptom presentation. The ICD-11 defin-
ition nevertheless provides examples of experiences,
such as torture, slavery, genocide campaigns, prolonged
domestic violence, and repeated childhood sexual or
physical abuse, that may be associated with the
diagnosis.
Long-standing proposals to distinguish this disorder
from PTSD were rejected in the DSM-5. However, em-
pirical research using techniques such as latent class
analysis and latent profile analysis has supported the dis-
tinction between PTSD and complex PTSD as well as
the association between complex PTSD and trauma in
childhood [60].
Prolonged grief disorder
The inclusion of this disorder in the ICD-11 followed
careful consideration of the boundaries between normal
and atypically severe grief as well as cultural/religious in-
fluences on the grieving processes. The evidence was
judged sufficient to introduce a formal diagnosis for the
minority of grieving individuals who may need profes-
sional services to overcome persistent and severe
mourning [63]. The disorder is characterized by a perva-
sive longing for or persistent preoccupation with the de-
ceased, accompanied by intense emotional pain. It can
only be diagnosed if the symptoms persist beyond a
period of 6 months — or longer if extended periods of
acute grief are culturally normative for that individual
[64]. In contrast to PTSD, where intrusive memories are
generally characterized by fear or horror, preoccupation
and longing often involve positive memories about the
Fig. 12 Chris Brewin. Dr. Chris Brewin, FAcSS, FMedSci, FBA, is
Emeritus Professor of Clinical Psychology at University College
London and a former consultant clinical psychologist at the
Traumatic Stress Clinic, part of Camden & Islington NHS
Foundation Trust
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lost loved one. In the DSM-5, the evidence was only
considered sufficient to include a somewhat differently
defined ‘condition for further study’ involving symptoms
lasting for at least 12 months after a death, termed ‘per-
sistent complex bereavement disorder’.
Adjustment disorder
This frequently used but ill-defined diagnosis has been
reformulated more precisely in the ICD-11 [65]. It is
characterized by the presence of two symptoms, namely
preoccupation with the stressors and indications of fail-
ure to adapt such as sleep or concentration problems
[66]. It can be assigned some days after the stressor has
impacted on the person, and it is typically expected to
resolve within 6 months unless the stressor persists for a
longer duration. Adjustment disorder is not a trivial con-
dition — if it goes undetected and untreated it may lead
to more severe mental disorders or an elevated risk of
suicide [67, 68].
The four diagnoses presented here are intended to ful-
fill the aim of the ICD-11 to provide clear, simple diag-
noses that meet the needs of clinicians worldwide. A
field study conducted by the WHO with international
practitioners found that the new distinction between
PTSD and complex PTSD was easily applied but that
there was some difficulty in applying the narrower defin-
ition of PTSD [69]. The forthcoming Clinical Descrip-
tions and Diagnostic Guidelines will better educate
clinicians in how to apply the descriptions of the re-
quired symptoms [20]. The more specific formulations
are also likely to be beneficial to researchers who can
now identify much more homogeneous groups of pa-
tients, assisting the search for biological markers. Com-
parisons with the DSM-5 will enable key diagnostic
assumptions to be tested. The empirical data generated
by the new diagnoses promise to yield a much greater
understanding of how to recognize and treat these disor-
ders in different settings worldwide [70–72].
The classification of feeding and eating disorders
Kathleen M. Pike (Fig. 13) and Carlos M. Grilo (Fig. 14)
The conceptual core of the ‘feeding and eating disorders’
(FED) grouping of disorders involves abnormal eating or
feeding behaviors that are not better accounted for by
other health conditions and are neither developmentally
appropriate nor culturally sanctioned [73]. The ICD-11
classification of FEDs, guided by the principles of enhan-
cing clinical utility and global relevance, includes
changes supported by an evidence base accumulated
during the more than 25 years since the ICD-10 was
published and also supported by field trials [74]. This
grouping combines feeding disorders and eating disor-
ders, representing the integration of two previously
distinct sections, a decision that parallels changes in the
DSM-5 [5, 75].
Feeding disorders include a set of conditions charac-
terized by restricted or limited intake (avoidant restrict-
ive food intake disorder; ARFID), behavioral
disturbances such as eating of non-edible substances
(pica), or voluntary regurgitation of foods (rumination–
regurgitation disorder) in the absence of shape/weight
concerns. In contrast, eating disorders (anorexia nervosa
(AN), bulimia nervosa (BN), and binge-eating disorder
(BED)) are characterized by disturbances in eating be-
haviors accompanied by preoccupation with food, body
weight, or shape in distinct patterns for each diagnosis.
Bringing together FEDs in a single grouping represents
an expanded appreciation for the clinical significance of
feeding problems during infancy and childhood [75, 76].
The guidelines for pica and rumination–regurgitation
disorder have not changed substantially from the ICD-
Fig. 13 Kathleen M. Pike. Dr. Kathleen M. Pike is a clinical
psychologist and Professor of Psychology in Psychiatry and
Epidemiology at Columbia University Irving Medical Center. She
serves as Director of the Global Mental Health WHO Collaborating
Centre and Chair of the Faculty Steering Committee for the Global
Mental Health Programs at Columbia. She was a member of the
WHO ICD-11 Feeding and Eating Disorders Group, ICD-11 Field
Studies Coordination Group, and the DSM-5 Cultural
Consultation Group
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10. ARFID, which is characterized by restricted or lim-
ited food intake but not a disturbance in body image,
represents a new diagnosis, though the feeding distur-
bances associated with ARFID have long been recog-
nized by clinicians. We have limited research on the
etiology, prognosis, natural outcome, or treatment of
ARFID. The inclusion of ARFID in the ICD-11 should
provide greater guidance regarding the operationaliza-
tion of a working diagnosis, which we expect will stimu-
late attention and research that will advance
understanding and treatment.
Among the eating disorders, the core conceptual
characterization of AN and BN remain consistent with
the ICD-10. However, detailed specifications regarding
the essential features of these two disorders were revised
based on updated empirical data and clinical practice.
These revisions had the goal of enhancing the clinical
utility of the diagnoses and reducing the use of ‘atypical’,
‘other specified’, or ‘unspecified’ diagnostic categories in
the ICD-10, which have limited clinical utility or infor-
mational value.
For AN in the ICD-11, the hallmark feature remains, a
low body weight for height, age, and developmental
stage that is not better accounted for by another condi-
tion. The ICD-11 provides general guidelines for defin-
ing low weight. Specifically, it provides the commonly
used guidelines of a body mass index (BMI) of less than
18.5 kg/m2 in adults and a BMI-for-age under fifth per-
centile in children/adolescents for diagnosing low
weight. However, the ICD-11 guidelines indicate that
these thresholds should be used as general points of ref-
erence but are not required thresholds for AN. This is
important given cultural and individual variations, and
thus allows AN to be diagnosed at higher weights in
some circumstances. In addition, the essential features
explicitly state that “rapid weight loss (e.g., more than
20% of total body weight within 6 months) may replace
the low body weight guideline as long as other diagnostic
requirements are met.”
Another feature added to the diagnosis of AN is the
qualifier for the severity of underweight status, which re-
flects findings indicating that severe underweight status
may have important prognostic implications in terms of
increased risk of other health complications, increased
mortality risk, and overall poorer outcome in adults
[77–80]. The ICD-11 specifier of severity of underweight
for AN in some ways roughly parallels a change in the
DSM-5 in which AN severity is based on BMI. To date,
research has provided limited support for the DSM-5
low BMI specifier ratings across both European [81–84]
and US [85, 86] samples. However, one study found that
lower BMI categories were significantly related to indica-
tors of need for greater services such as number of hos-
pitalizations [85].
The ICD-11 qualifiers for AN related to low body
weight include ‘significantly low body weight’ and ‘dan-
gerously low body weight’. The third qualifier related to
weight status is ‘anorexia nervosa in recovery with nor-
mal body weight’. The ICD-11 included this qualifier to
avoid the previously existing conundrum that individuals
who achieved weight restoration while in treatment
would no longer meet diagnostic thresholds for AN des-
pite continuing to have all the other symptoms of AN
and not being sufficiently recovered to maintain the
weight gain without continued treatment. The technical
inability to diagnose someone with AN at such a point
in care was particularly problematic in certain contexts
in which a diagnosis is essential for receiving certain
levels of care based on health systems and policies. The
proposed qualifier provides the elegant solution of iden-
tifying the weight gain while still retaining the diagnosis
of AN. As provided by this qualifier, the diagnosis of AN
is retained “until a full and lasting recovery is achieved,
as indicated by the maintenance of a healthy weight and
the cessation of behaviours aimed at reducing body
weight, independent of the provision of treatment (e.g., for
at least 1 year after intensive treatment is withdrawn)”.
In contrast to the DSM-5, the ICD-11 retains the quali-
fiers of ‘restricting pattern’ versus ‘binge–purge pattern’
of compensatory weight-related behaviors.
In the case of BN, the conceptual core remains centred
around binge-eating behaviour coupled with regular and
significant weight-compensatory behaviors. Two key
changes regarding the clinical assessment of binge-
eating behaviour are noteworthy. First, the frequency
threshold of binge eating for BN was reduced to once a
Fig. 14 Carlos M. Grilo. Dr. Carlos M. Grilo, a clinical psychologist, is
Professor of Psychiatry at the Yale University School of Medicine and
Professor of Psychology at Yale University. He is the Founding
Director of the Yale Program for Obesity, Weight, and Eating
Research (POWER) and has, as Principal Investigator, been fully and
continuously funded by the National Institutes of Health for 25 years.
He previously served as Director of Psychology at the Yale
Psychiatric Institute and as Director of Training in Clinical and
Community Psychology at the Yale School of Medicine
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week or more over a period of at least 1 month. The
lowered frequency/duration stipulations represent both
empirical data and prioritization of clinical utility. Data
assessing ‘subthreshold’ BN indicate that individuals who
binge eat at a frequency of once weekly are comparable
to those individuals who do so more frequently [87].
The shortened duration reflects the clinical reality that
access to care is limited in many parts of the world, and
if someone presents with all the features of BN for a
duration of 1 month, they should receive clinical care
without further delay.
In addition to the changes in specifications to AN and
BN, the most significant addition to the eating disorders
grouping was the inclusion of BED as a separate cat-
egory. BED is a disturbance characterized by recurrent
binge eating, associated with significant distress, in the
absence of inappropriate weight-compensatory behav-
iors. The addition of BED as a formal diagnosis, which
parallels changes in the DSM-5, follows two decades of
research on the clinical significance and validity of this
diagnostic construct [88], which had previously been de-
scribed as a research category in the Appendix of the
DSM-IV. Emerging research worldwide has indicated
the prevalence of BED relative to other eating disorders
and established the clinical and public health signifi-
cance of this diagnostic construct [89, 90].
Both BN and BED are based on the occurrence of
binge eating, and the ICD-11 also incorporates
changes regarding the definition of what constitutes
an episode of binge eating. In the ICD-11, binge eat-
ing is defined as a time when an “individual eats not-
ably more and/or differently than usual and feels
unable to stop eating or limit the type or amount of
food eaten. Other characteristics of binge-eating epi-
sodes may include eating alone because of embarrass-
ment, eating foods that are not part of the
individual’s regular diet, eating large amounts of food
in spite of not feeling hungry, and eating faster than
usual” [74]. These other features reflecting a general
loss of control or a difference in the eating behaviors
both resonate with clinicians and patients and parallel
the behavioral indicators for establishing binge eating
in the DSM-IV/DSM-5, which have received empirical
support [91]. Also notable is that the ICD-11 guide-
lines have eliminated the requirement that binge-
eating episodes be defined by an objectively unusually
large amount of food. This change, which is at odds
with the DSM-5, is consistent with increasing evi-
dence suggesting that the subjective experience (most
notably a sense of loss of control) is more important
that the quantity eaten during those episodes [92, 93].
In both BN and BED, there is marked distress about
the pattern of binge eating or significant impairment in
personal, family, social, educational, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning. Distress associated
specifically with binge eating has been shown to be an
important discriminatory feature [94]. Interestingly,
while the ICD-11 requires marked distress for both BN
and BED, the DSM-5 does so for BED but not for BN,
perhaps due to the clinical assumption that the extreme
weight-compensatory behaviors undoubtedly reflect dis-
tress. Finally, for both AN and BN, a disturbance in body
image is required, whereas for BED the ICD-11 notes
that, while overvaluation of shape/weight is commonly
present, it is not required; this is at odds with the DSM-
5 for BED but is consistent with empirical data [20, 95].
The new ICD-11 guidelines for FED, which follow em-
pirical advances and received support in the field trial
[74], should facilitate clinical practice worldwide. As
noted above, several of the major changes and additions
have broadened the diagnostic guidance in a balanced
fashion to better capture clinical realties and reduce
‘technicalities’ that do not appear to be clinically or em-
pirically meaningful (e.g. examples of what constitutes
binge eating, frequency/duration stipulations, definition
of abnormally low weight) but that can delay clinical
care. Although critics might voice concerns that some of
the changes involving broadening of certain features (i.e.
removing arbitrary symptom counts and duration cut-
points not supported by research) as compared to the
DSM-5 might result in over-diagnosis, a recent large-
scale epidemiological study in the US did not provide
support for such concerns [96]. We believe that the
ICD-11 guidelines effectively capture the diverse clinical
realities across the developmental life course and around
the world, and we anticipate that the changes made in
the ICD-11 guidelines for FEDs will aid better diagnosis
and treatment.
Disorders of addictive behaviour
Naomi A Fineberg (Fig. 15)
The ICD-11 revision heralds a welcome sea change in
the clinical conceptualization of addictive behaviour.
First and foremost, by introducing the new section ‘Dis-
orders due to substance use or addictive behaviours’, the
ICD-11 brings together substance use disorders with dis-
orders of addictive behaviour under one conceptual
framework. In this respect, it aligns with and expands
upon similar changes made in the DSM-5 [5]; the cen-
tral role of addiction, as a trans-diagnostic process
underpinning a broad range of harmful behaviors, is pri-
oritized and its key behavioral constituents are defined
as impaired control, precedence over other interests and
activities, and continuation or escalation of the behav-
iour despite negative consequences.
Second, the ICD-11 recognizes, for the first time, a
group of ‘disorders due to addictive behaviours’. These
are defined as clinically significant syndromes associated
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with distress or dysfunction that develop as a result of
repetitive rewarding behaviors other than the use of
dependence-producing substances. They include gam-
bling disorder (previously classified with habit and im-
pulse disorders) and gaming disorder (a new diagnosis),
both of which may involve online or offline behaviour.
In the ICD-11, the definition of gambling disorder has
been adjusted in line within the addiction framework.
Third, gaming disorder is accepted as a diagnosis for
the first time (see below), defined by persistent or recur-
rent addictive online or offline gaming of such severity
so as to cause significant impairment in personal, family,
social, educational, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning. Fourth, the Internet is included as a
diagnostic specifier, to the extent that gambling disorder
can be separately diagnosed as being predominantly off-
line or online. Fifth, by creating residual categories
(‘other specified’ or ‘unspecified disorders of addictive
behaviour’) attention is given to individuals not meeting
the diagnostic criteria for an existing disorder, who
nevertheless experience significant distress or impair-
ment associated with a range of otherwise neglected
addictive behaviors that might include shopping, steal-
ing, pornography viewing, web-streaming, social media
use, and other behaviors, for which there is as yet insuf-
ficient evidence to justify classification as a diagnosis. Fi-
nally, as not all forms of gambling or gaming meet the
threshold for a diagnosable condition, definitions for
‘hazardous gaming’ and ‘hazardous gambling or betting’
have additionally been included as alternatives to diag-
nostic entities so that public health may be promoted.
The rationale for these recommendations is derived
from in-depth scientific analysis coupled with multi-
professional clinical and public health experience, in-
volving experts from over 25 countries; changes from
the ICD-10 were debated in a series of workgroup
meetings [97]. Indeed, discussion in the scientific lit-
erature has continued as emerging data suggests that,
alongside the phenomenological and psychobiological
overlaps between gambling and gaming disorders and
disorders of substance addiction [98, 99], including
high levels of clinical comorbidity, overlaps are also
to be found with certain impulse control disorders,
such as kleptomania and compulsive sexual behaviour
disorder, and obsessive–compulsive or related disor-
ders such as trichotillomania and excoriation disorder
[100, 101]. Thus, as research grows and our under-
standing of these and other putative addictive disor-
ders crystallizes, further revisions to some of these
ICD sections may arise.
In its deliberations, the ICD-11 focused on clinical and
public health utility, with an explicit aim of improving
primary care in non-specialist settings [18]. The new
classification is thus expected to raise awareness of these
otherwise overlooked disorders of behavioral addiction
among clinicians and the public and facilitate the devel-
opment of clinical and public health interventions. The
new classification will also invigorate research into the
role of the Internet as both a conduit and a potential
moderator of addictive behaviors.
The inclusion of gaming disorder in the ICD-11 forms a
basis for the development and implementation of stan-
dardized diagnostic interviews and symptom measures,
potentially leading to the discovery of effective interven-
tions. However, this has generated a lively debate, with
some authors expressing concern that the scientific basis
for gaming disorder is currently too weak or that non-
problematic gamers could be stigmatized by its inclusion
[102, 103]. A series of commentaries published in the last
year (reviewed in [98]) has largely favored the inclusion of
gaming disorder in the ICD-11. Evidence demonstrating
the negative effects of pathological gaming in multiple
psychosocial domains [104] played an influential role.
While it is laudable to consider the unwanted effect of
stigmatization when a diagnosis is newly introduced
[105], this argument must be balanced against clinical
Fig. 15 Naomi A Fineberg. Dr. Naomi A Fineberg is a consultant
psychiatrist and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of
Hertfordshire, and Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS
Foundation Trust, UK. She specializes in the research and treatment
of obsessive–compulsive and related disorders. She chairs the World
Psychiatric Association Scientific Section for Anxiety and Obsessive–
Compulsive Disorders and an EU COST Action for the Study of
Problematic Internet Usage
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and public health needs [97]. Treatment demand world-
wide and the significant distress, functional impairment,
and suffering encountered by those experiencing disor-
ders of behavioral addiction, such as gambling and gam-
ing disorder, underlies the pressing need for their
adoption by the ICD-11. By classifying these disorders
within an addiction framework, the ICD-11 endorses the
approach that addictive behaviour is not exclusively a
medical problem, and that prevention and reduction of
the associated health and social burden may be achieved
by interventions inside and outside the health sector [1].
Compulsive sexual behaviour disorder
Peer Briken (Fig. 16)
The decision to include compulsive sexual behaviour
disorder (CSBD) in the group of impulse control
disorders in the ICD-11 marks a paradigm shift from a
sexual and mental health perspective, especially consid-
ering that CSBD is now precisely described through
diagnostic guidelines [2, 100]. Why consider this a shift
in paradigm? The ICD-10 included the category ‘exces-
sive sexual drive’, which, however, did not include a spe-
cific description of the symptoms but did reference
‘nymphomania’ and ‘satyriasis’. The diagnosis was placed
in the grouping of sexual dysfunctions within the Mental
and Behavioral Disorders chapter of the ICD-10 because
it concerned sexual behaviour.
In contrast, the ICD-11 guidelines describe CSBD as
characterized by “a persistent pattern of failure to control
intense, repetitive sexual impulses or urges resulting in
repetitive sexual behaviour” ([2], p. 109) over an ex-
tended period. In persons with this disorder, sexual be-
haviour has become a central focus of their life, with
unsuccessful efforts to control or significantly reduce it
as well as adverse consequences (e.g. repeated relation-
ship disruption, occupational consequences, negative im-
pact on health). The behaviour results in marked
distress or significant impairment. The ICD-11 diagnos-
tic guidelines largely avoid focusing on possible distal
aetiological issues (e.g. traumatic sexual experiences)
and the many contexts in which compulsive sexual be-
haviour occur (e.g. using sex as a coping strategy in re-
sponse to negative emotions). This is advantageous
because CSBD is an umbrella construct that likely has a
variety of aetiologies not directly relevant to diagnostic
description.
Although the word ‘compulsive’ is included in the
name because that is a very common way of referring to
this phenomenon in the literature, sexual behaviour in
CSBD is not considered a true compulsion that occurs
in relation to intrusive, unwanted and typically anxiety-
provoking thoughts (obsessions) as in OCD. Rather,
CSBD is a repetitive, typically initially rewarding behav-
iour pattern that the person feels unable to control,
which appears to have both impulsive and compulsive
elements [106]. Early in the development of the behav-
iour pattern, impulsivity and positive reinforcement
(pleasure) are the most important elements. Later in the
course of the disorder, compulsive aspects and negative
reinforcement (e.g. temporary improvement of negative
mood) are likely to become increasingly important in
sustaining the behaviors [107]. The most thoroughly in-
vestigated theoretical model on the interplay between
excitatory and inhibitory influences on sexual behaviour
is the dual control model [108], according to which CS
BD could be a problem when sexual self-control is rela-
tively low and sexual responsiveness/excitability is rela-
tively high [109, 110]. Clinically, the lack of self-control
is often subjectively experienced as urgency, while sex in
CSBD may fulfill a variety of different functions.
Fig. 16 Peer Briken. Dr. Peer Briken, is Professor for Sex Research,
Sexual Medicine, and Forensic Psychiatry and Director of the
Institute for Sex Research, Sexual Medicine, and Forensic Psychiatry,
University Medical Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany, since 2010.
He was President of the German Society for Sex Research from 2010
to 2016. Since 2016, he is a member of the Independent
Commission for the Inquiry of Sexual Abuse of Children in Germany.
He is a consultant to the World Health Organization regarding the
development of the ICD-11 classification of sexual disorders and
sexual health
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Treatment therefore focuses on improvement of sexual
self-control as well as coping with the underlying emo-
tional states and motives.
Available representative community data indicate that
subjective difficulty in adequately controlling sexual be-
haviour is common [111], although such subjective diffi-
culty alone is not sufficient for a diagnosis of CSDB. The
ICD-11 guidelines indicate that CSBD “should not be di-
agnosed based on distress related to moral judgements
and disapproval about sexual impulses, urges, or behav-
iours that would otherwise not be considered indicative
of psychopathology (e.g. a woman who believes that she
should not have sexual impulses at all; a religious young
man who believes that he should never masturbate; a
person who is distressed about their homosexual attrac-
tion or behaviour).” Available evidence suggests a preva-
lence of 10–12% for men and 7% for women for sexual
compulsivity; however, the new CSBD guidelines are yet
to be used in epidemiological studies (e.g. [111–113]).
How will this diagnostic category advance the field?
From a sexual and mental health perspective, inclusion
in the classification system suggests that CSBD can be
treated, that mental health service systems should be
capable of providing the treatment, and that this treat-
ment should be covered by health insurance. Further-
more, only a disorder that is constructed with regards to
valid and reliable guidelines can be researched accord-
ingly. In the short time since the conceptualization of
CSBD as an impulse control disorder has been put for-
ward [100] there have been numerous new studies, with
the focus of this research being significantly broadened
by a range of new research groups. Research has investi-
gated disorder constructs related to CSBD [114] and val-
idation of instruments [115] as well as aetiological [106,
114] and therapeutic approaches [116–118]. The signifi-
cance of impulsivity, compulsivity, and addiction is still
the subject of ongoing studies and discussions in the
constructs of CSBD and has not been conclusively
clarified.
From a historical point of view, it should be noted
that clinicians and scientists [119] described a fore-
runner diagnosis to CSBD more than 100 years ago.
In German psychopathology, there has been a discus-
sion about compulsive or dysregulated forms of sexual
expression since the 1940s (overview in Giese [120]).
The discussion became internationally prominent in
the US following the publication, in 1983, of Carnes’
book Out of the Shadows: Understanding Sexual Ad-
diction [121], which provided a conceptualization of
the sexual addiction model and how 12-step self-help
programmes could be helpful. Nevertheless, despite
some popularization of this idea, it has also received
significant criticism [122]. At a minimum, it must be
acknowledged that, in some parts of the world,
including North America, there is a risk that any
conceptualization of non-mainstream sexuality as dis-
ordered will be seized upon in unintended, sex-
negative ways based on religious attitudes hostile to
sexuality and by religiously based therapies or self-
help groups. This potentially creates a problem for a
scientifically sound approach to CSBD.
In order to rule out inappropriate pathologization and
protect against misuse, the guidelines state that “distress
that is entirely related to moral judgments and disap-
proval about sexual impulses, urges, or behaviours is not
sufficient to meet this requirement”. The guidelines fur-
ther indicate that high levels of sexual interest and be-
haviour in the absence of impaired sexual self-control
and distress or impairment, or during relatively brief pe-
riods, should not be diagnosed as CSBD. Similarly, high
levels of sexual interest and behaviour in adolescents
should not be labeled as CSBD, even if associated with
distress.
It has sometimes been claimed (e.g. [123]) that the
idea that sexual behaviour can be compulsive or re-
semble an addiction emerged as a product of conser-
vative (e.g. religious) sexual norms, accompanied by
new psychiatric diagnostic labels. However, in the
case of CSBD this does not seem to be true. Rather,
changes in social and environmental conditions (e.g.
digital media) have led to changes in symptomatic ex-
pression, which in turn may suggest the need to alter
diagnostic classifications. We live in a digital world
where the availability of pornography and the possi-
bilities of sexual interactions without prolonged rela-
tionships have changed the reasons why patients
come into clinical practice.
Accordingly, in our clinic, there has not been a change
in the numbers of patients who present for treatment,
yet changes in the manifestation of this condition have
been observed. For example, 20 years ago, most cases in-
volved visits to peep shows or use of sex workers or tele-
phone sex, whereas, currently, CSBD is primarily related
to the use of digital media, most often with uncontrolled
use of pornography sites or multiple sexual contacts via
dating apps. Of note, when CSBD occurs in combination
with a paraphilic disorder or criminal sexual behaviour it
has a different profile.
In clinical practice, the new guidelines should help en-
sure that the threshold for diagnosis is not too low and
thus running the risk of false positive diagnoses. On the
other hand, it is important that the threshold emphasizes
clearly pathological behaviour — not all individuals who
claim they are ‘sex addicts’ automatically fulfill the diag-
nostic requirements for CSBD. Indeed, the ICD-11 aims
to identify those individuals for whom CSBD is a serious
problem and who should appropriately receive
treatment.
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Gender identity-related diagnoses
Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis (Fig. 17)
Since the first publications of gender identity-related
diagnoses in the ICD and the DSM [5], these diagnoses
have undergone significant changes in conceptualization,
terminology, and placement. In the ICD-10, the diagno-
ses were ‘gender identity disorder’ for children and
‘transsexualism’ for adolescents/adults. Conversely, the
DSM-IV had one overarching diagnosis of ‘gender iden-
tity disorder’ for both children and adolescents/adults,
albeit with different indicators for the two groups. In the
ICD-11, the names of the diagnoses have been changed,
reflecting a different conceptualization of the
phenomenon; this was also the case in the DSM-5 to
some extent. In the ICD-11, the diagnoses are ‘gender
incongruence of childhood’ for pre-pubertal children
and ‘gender incongruence of adolescence and adulthood’
for post-pubertal individuals. These names highlight the
core of the condition, that is, incongruence between a
person’s experienced gender or gender identity and the
sex (usually) assigned at birth. The DSM-5 uses the term
‘gender dysphoria’ for all age groups.
There has been much dispute on the question of
whether gender-variant identities should be viewed as
mental disorders or as variations within the normal
range. Gender incongruence may or may not be associ-
ated with distress. In the DSM-5, clinically significant
distress is a requirement for the diagnosis. Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender advocacy groups have lobbied
to remove gender dysphoria altogether from the DSM-5
as retention in this psychiatric classification system was
viewed as stigmatizing. Despite this opposition, the
American Psychiatric Association decided to retain the
diagnosis. People may seek psychological care or gender-
confirming treatment to alter physical sex characteristics
(e.g. by hormone treatment and/or surgery) and support
services need a billable diagnosis code. Removing gender
dysphoria from the DSM was expected to create serious
problems with access to care in many countries, which
contributed considerably to the American Psychiatric
Association’s decision to keep gender dysphoria in the
DSM.
In the absence of distress, gender incongruence cannot
be conceptualized as a mental disorder, yet people may
need treatment. Although the prevalence of mental
health problems is elevated among transgender people
and distress (internally driven or as a result of outside
forces) may be present, clinically significant distress does
not seem to be inherent in gender incongruence [124,
125]. The ICD is a broader document than the DSM, as
it encompasses mental disorders as well as other condi-
tions needing treatment. The WHO, a United Nations
agency, views health as a human right, creating a legal
obligation for member states not only to ensure access
to timely and affordable healthcare of good quality, but
also to provide for the underlying determinants of health
[126]. Stigma may be one such determinant, as there is
evidence that it is associated with health problems [127,
128]. In many places, mental illness is stigmatized [129,
130] and stigma against transgender people is also highly
prevalent [131, 132], creating a ‘double stigma’ burden
for this community. In order to avoid this double stigma,
the WHO, advised by the Working Group on the Classi-
fication of Sexual Disorders and Sexual Health, moved
the gender identity-related diagnoses away from the
mental disorders chapter and placed them in a new
chapter entitled Conditions Related to Sexual Health in
the ICD-11. This change allows for the diagnosis in a
classification system of conditions that may need treat-
ment, and therefore ensures access to care for trans-
gender people without the additional burden of
requiring a mental health disorder diagnosis.
There has been great concern that pre-pubertal chil-
dren who only show gender-variant behaviour but have
no gender identity-related problems would erroneously
receive a diagnosis and be treated by clinicians and par-
ents as future transgender adults [133]. By introducing
an anatomic dysphoria requirement and lengthening the
required duration of the gender incongruence, the ICD-
11 diagnosis for children has been narrowed consider-
ably. However, despite this tightening of requirements
and the move away from the mental disorder chapter,
there are still differences of opinion regarding the reten-
tion of gender incongruence of childhood in the ICD-11;
some feel that even a non-psychiatric diagnosis can be
Fig. 17 Peggy Cohen-Kettenis. Professor Peggy Cohen-Kettenis is
Professor Emeritus of Medical Psychology at the Amsterdam UMC,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and was Director of
the hospital’s Center of Expertise on Gender Dysphoria. She was a
member of the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health’s Standards of Care Committee and of the Task Force of the
Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline on the endocrine
treatment of gender-dysphoric/gender-incongruent persons. She
was Chair of APA’s DSM-5 GID subcommittee and member of the
WHO ICD-11 Working Group on Sexual Disorders and Sexual Health
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harmful to children [134]. However, although pre-
pubertal children do not need a diagnosis for medical
treatment, they may need specialized supportive mental
health services as well as family and social (for example,
school) interventions. Retention helps to preserve access
to care for a vulnerable and already stigmatized group
[135].
Another major conceptual change for gender incon-
gruence diagnoses in ICD-11 is a move away from bin-
ary thinking. Instead of the concepts of ‘male’ versus
‘female’ and ‘transsexual’ versus ‘non-transsexual’, the
ICD-11 reflects evidence of considerable variance in gen-
der and gender identity. As a result, people experiencing
some form of gender incongruence who would previ-
ously be considered non-transsexual [135], and therefore
not eligible for ‘classical’ gender affirming treatment
(hormones first, followed by various types of surgery),
may now be eligible for some form of medical treatment.
Type and timing may differ from the ‘classical’
treatment.
The inclusion of gender incongruence diagnoses in the
ICD-11 with the revised diagnostic guidelines and out-
side the mental health chapter will provide access to ap-
propriate and non-stigmatizing care for those individuals
with gender incongruence. It will also provide opportun-
ities for the much-needed education of health profes-
sionals and facilitate the research and development of
standards of care. The gender incongruence diagnoses
may thus guide clinicians and family members in making
decisions on clinical and non-clinical interventions.
Conclusion
Dan J. Stein and Geoffrey M. Reed
Overall, our view is that the various changes made in the
Mental, Behavioral or Neurodevelopmental Disorders
chapter of the ICD-11 contribute to a significant ad-
vancement in diagnostic classification as well as in men-
tal health practice and research. However, the ways in
which the ICD-11 as well as other important frame-
works, including the DSM-5 and the Research Domain
Criteria, have and have not advanced the field need to
be further understood. In order to do so, two key issues,
namely causality and thresholding, should be addressed.
Medical classifications that are based on etiology have
important advantages; such a classification system itself
provides clear targets for intervention. In the case of
mental disorders, this is not possible because the eti-
ology of mental disorders is not only multicausal but
also incompletely understood. Importantly, the ICD-11
chapter on Mental, Behavioral or Neurodevelopmental
Disorders incorporates the issues of etiology in a num-
ber of ways — certain groupings of disorders reflect
common underlying mechanisms (e.g. disorders of ad-
dictive behaviour), certain diagnoses are based on
specified causes (e.g. anxiety due to substance use or to
a medical disorder), and certain causal factors can be
classified (e.g. in the chapter on Factors Influencing
Health Status and Contact with Health Services) but are
not considered to be disorders. Continuous revisions of
the nosology are important in ensuring that etiology is
included to the maximal extent possible, and the ICD-11
chapter on Mental, Behavioral or Neurodevelopmental
Disorders therefore represents a useful update.
However, the fact that the ICD-11 classification of
mental disorders is not entirely based on causality raises
some important considerations. First, there is not neces-
sarily a close relationship between diagnosis, underlying
neurobiological vulnerabilities, social determinants, and
appropriate intervention. Second, there is likely to be
some artefactual increase in comorbidity — multiple
diagnoses of mental disorders in a particular individual
may not indicate that a range of truly separate sets of
underlying psychobiological processes are involved but
rather may simply point to greater underlying dysfunc-
tion. Third, there is a temptation to reify psychiatric
constructs, inappropriately regarding them as natural
kinds [136]. All of these considerations point to the im-
portance of regarding mental disorder classification sys-
tems as tentative, of emphasizing the need for careful
individualized assessment, and of recognizing the need
for a range of interventions to address the multiple
causal factors at play in mental illness.
Medical classifications face the perennial problem of
drawing thresholds among disorders as well as between
such disorders and normality; this is a particularly fraught
issue in mental disorders, where critics have raised con-
cerns about inappropriate over-medicalization. The hope
that advances in neuroscience would lead to biomarkers
with sensitivity and specificity has not materialized. Im-
portantly, given its focus on use in a wide range of set-
tings, the WHO Department of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse is providing diagnostic guidelines for
the ICD-11 chapter on Mental, Behavioral or Neurodeve-
lopmental Disorders that allow flexible use of clinical
judgment, rather than focusing on narrow stipulations of
symptom counts or duration that may improve reliability
but not necessarily validity. These ICD-11 diagnostic
guidelines for use in clinical settings have, however,
undergone rigorous field testing; changes in the diagnos-
tic guidelines from ICD-10 to ICD-11 are not simply arbi-
trary or capricious, but rather reflect the outcome of
ongoing developments in nosological science.
Nevertheless, the fact that the ICD-11 chapter relies
on clinical guidelines rather than on specific cut-points
to draw boundaries, again raises a number of important
considerations. First, the ICD-11 diagnostic guidelines
place a great deal of emphasis on the ‘clinical criterion’
— the distress and impairment that are associated with
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symptoms. Second, although dimensional constructs
have been included in a number of places in the ICD-11,
this remains a largely categorical system that does not
incorporate fine-tuned assessment of symptom varia-
tions. Third, there will again be a temptation to reify the
particular boundaries set by the classification system,
even where this is explicitly not intended, inappropri-
ately overlooking the burden of disease associated with
subclinical presentations or inappropriately underesti-
mating the resilience of those who meet clinical thresh-
olds. These considerations again point to the tentative
nature of mental disorders classifications, to the need for
supplementary individualized assessment, and to the im-
portance of non-reductionistic conceptual approaches.
In summary, our view of psychiatric classification in
general, and of the ICD-11 in particular, is one that avoids
the overly optimistic view that nosology can or should re-
solve all the key debates in the field, and one that steers
clear of the overly pessimistic view that the classification
of mental disorders is inherently deeply and necessarily
flawed. Global mental health is intimately linked with the
sustainable goals for development [137], and the ICD-11
provides an important tool for these endeavors. In particu-
lar, its focus on global applicability and clinical utility in
non-specialized primary care settings will maximize the
likelihood that it will be adopted by mental health profes-
sionals and administrators as well as enhance its applica-
tion in non-specialist settings and its usefulness for scaling
up evidence-based interventions. The new mental disor-
ders classification in ICD-11 and its accompanying diag-
nostic guidelines therefore represent an important, albeit
iterative, advance for the field.
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